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STATUTORY NOTE
TORTS-TEXAS WRONGFUL DEATH

ACT-Is AN ACTION FOR BREACH

OF AN IMPLIED WARRANTY RECOVERABLE UNDER THE TEXAS WRONG-

FUL DEATH ACT? TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.

4671-78 (1952).

During the 110-year history of the Texas Wrongful Death Act,1 the
Texas courts have never squarely faced the issue of whether or not a
breach of an implied warranty is recoverable under such act. However,
other jurisdictions, in deciding this issue, have cited Texas as a jurisdiction disallowing recovery.
The very reason for the adoption of the Texas Wrongful Death Act
was to provide a recovery for death. At common law, there was no right
of action for the death of an individual. 2 Lord Ellenborough, in 1808,
stated "In a civil court, the death of a human being could not be complained of as an injury .... '"3 Upon examination of this common law
doctrine, it becomes obvious that, as far as liability is concerned, it
would be more advantageous for the defendant if the injuries incurred
result in death, instead of some lesser injury. The defendant would be
liable to the injured person for any injuries less than death, but if the
injured person died, so would the defendant's liability. Although Lord
Ellenborough cited no authority for pronouncing this principle of no
recovery, 4 it became the generally accepted law in England5 and the
United States.6
Due to the harshness of the common law principle, whereby any
cause of action for the death of an individual died with the decedent,
England adopted the Fatal Accidents Act, commonly referred to as Lord
Campbell's Act:
Whensoever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful
act, neglect, or default, and the act, neglect, or default is such as
would (if death had not ensued) have entitled the party injured to
maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, then
1 The Texas Wrongful Death Act is composed of TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 467178 (1952).
2 Baker v. Bolton, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (N.P. 1808). The plaintiff's wife was killed when
the stagecoach upon which she was riding overturned.
3 Id. For a thorough discussion see Smedley, Wrongful Death-Basis of the Common
Law Rules, 13 VAND. L. Rav. 605 (1960), which discusses another common law principle
of actio personalis moritur cum persona-a personal action dies with the person.
4 Baker v. Bolton, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (N.P. 1808).
5 See, e.g., Clark v. London Gen. Omnibus Co., [1906] 2 K.B. 648; Osborn v. Gillett,
L.R. 8 Ex. 88 (1873).
6 See, e.g., Braun v. Riel, 40 S.W.2d 621, 622 (Mo. 1931); Howson v. Foster Beef Co.,
177 A. 656, 660 (N.H. 1935); Farmers' & Mechanics' Nat'l Bank v. Hanks, 104 Tex. 320,
323, 137 S.W. 1120, 1122 (1911). Contra, Cross v. Guthery, 2 Root 90, 92 (Conn. 1794),
where the plaintiff husband was allowed to recover for the loss of his wife's services due
to her death caused by a surgeon's unskillfulness.
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and in every such case the person who would have been liable if
death had not ensued shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured . .. .7
Subsequently, each state in the United States enacted a wrongful death
act.8 The Texas Death Act reads:
When an injury causing the death of any person is caused by the
wrongful act, neglect, carelessness, unskillfulness, or default of another person ... such person ... shall be liable in damages for the
injuries causing such death.9
These statutes, modeled after Lord Campbell's Act, create a cause of
action in favor of the deceased's statutory beneficiaries.
Texas, 10 along with several other states," has also adopted "survival
statutes," which further abrogate the harsh common law doctrine.
These statutes bestow immortality upon all causes of action to which
the deceased would have been entitled, had he not died, by conveying
2
the cause of action to the deceased's statutory beneficiaries.'
Texas has often been cited as being a jurisdiction where recovery
is not allowed for a breach of implied warranty.' 3 However, a majority
4
of the states have either allowed recovery or indicated that they would.'
7 Lord Campbell's Act, 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93 (1846).
8 39 IowA L. REv. 494, 495 n.5 (1954) gives a listing of each state's wrongful death acts.
9 Compare Tax. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4671(1) (1952): "When an injury causing the
death of any person is caused by the wrongful act, neglect, carelessness, unskillfulness, or
default of another .... " with Lord Campbell's Act, 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93 (1846): "Whensoever the death of a person shall be caused by a wrongful act, neglect, or default ....
10TEx, REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5525 (1958) ("Survival Statute"): "All causes of action
upon which suit has been or may hereafter be brought for personal injuries, or for injuries resulting in death, whether such injuries be to the health or to the reputation, or
to the person of the injured party, shall not abate by reason of the death .... "
11E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-906 (1962); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-599 (1958); N.H.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 556.9 (1955).
12 TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5525 (1958). However, the cause of action for the injuries to the beneficiaries, due to the death, arises from Tax. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
4671 (1952): "When an injury causing the death of any person is caused by the wrongful
act, neglect, carelessness, unskillfulness, or default of another .... " What causes of action
should be encompassed by the preceding statement? Should it encompass both actions ex
delicto, which means tortious in nature, and ex contractu, or is it confined only to actions
ex delicto?
18 E.g., DiBelardino v. Lemmon Pharmacal Co., 208 A.2d 283, 285 (Pa. 1965); Schnabl
v. Ford Motor Co., 195 N.W.2d 602, 608 (Wis. 1972); 25A C.J.S. Death § 23, n.53.5 (1966).
14 See Thaggard v. Vafes, 119 So. 647, 649 (Ala. 1928); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod.,
Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1962); Foran v. Carangelo, 216 A.2d 638, 641 (Conn. 1966)
(dictum); Zostautas v. St. Anthony De Padua Hosp., 178 N.E.2d 303, 308 (Ill. 1961); Kelley
v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 268 A.2d 837, 838 (N.H. 1970), overruling Wadleigh
v. Howson, 189 A. 865 (N.H. 1937) and Howson v. Foster Beef Co., 177 A. 656 (N.H. 1935);
Santor v. Karagheusian, Inc., 207 A.2d 305, 311 (N.J. 1965); Goldberg v. Killsman Instr.
Corp., 191 N.E.2d 81, 82 (N.Y. 1963); Greco v. S.S. Kresge Co., 12 N.E.2d 557, 561 (N.Y.
1938); Schnabl v. Ford Motor Co., 195 N.W.2d 602, 609 (Wis. 1972). Contra, Gott v. Newark
Motors, Inc., 267 A.2d 596, 599 (Del. 1970) was based upon the Delaware Wrongful Death
Act, which is markedly different from the Texas Wrongful Death Act in that it reads:
"Whenever death is occasioned by unlawful violence or negligence .... " The Delaware
Death Act makes no mention of "wrongful act," "carelessness," "unskillness," or "de-
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The Texas authority cited in support of no recovery is Goelz v. J.K.
& Susie L. Wadley Research Institute & Blood Bank. 5 The sources 6
citing Goelz for the proposition that Texas does not allow recovery
rely upon this statement: "It has been held that under such statutes
recovery cannot be had for an implied warranty on the theory of breach
of contract."' 17 The preceding statement by the court was nothing more
than dictum. The court disallowed recovery in the decision based on its
determination that "the supplying of blood for a fee is in its essence
the rendition of a service, not a commercial sale of property.' '1 8 After
making this determination, the issue of breach of implied warranty was
no longer before the court.'9
There is no Texas case directly concerning recovery for breach of
implied warranty under the Texas Death Act. However, the Texas
Supreme Court has allowed recovery under the Death Act for death
resulting from the unseaworthiness of a vessel, 20 which is similar, if not
synonymous, to a breach of an implied warranty. 21 Seaworthiness means
"that there was, as it is often put, a 'warranty,' or more precisely stated,
an obligation, a duty owed to certain persons, that the vessel and its
fault," as does the Texas Death Act. Whiteley v. Webb's City, Inc., 55 So. 2d 730, 731
(Fla. 1951) (Chapman, Roberts, and Mathews, JJ., dissenting). The Florida Legislature,
two years later, amended the Death Act to include actions ex contractu and ex delicto.
Lovett v. Emory Univ., Inc., 156 S.E.2d 923, 925 (Ga. 1967). The Georgia Death Act gives
a cause of action when death results "from a crime or from criminal or other negligence
....." However, the court did say that an action would lie under the Death Act for death
resulting from the breach of an implied warranty with respect to certain enumerated
articles "intended for human consumption or use, where either knowledge of the defect
or negligence by the seller is an essential element." Necktas v. General Motors Corp.,
Pontiac Div., 259 N.E.2d 234, 236 (Mass. 1970) (Speigel and Kirk, JJ., dissenting), in which,
the statutory language restricted the causes of action to negligence or willful, wanton, or
reckless acts. Hasson Grocery Co. v. Cook, 17 So. 2d 791, 792 (Miss. 1944) in which the
Mississippi Death Act only extends a cause of action when the death has been "caused by
any real wrongful or negligent act, or omission, or by unsafe machinery, way or appliances
DiBelardino
.....
v. Lemmon Pharmacal Co., 208 A.2d 283, 285 (Pa. 1965) (Roberts and
Musmanno, JJ., dissenting). The Pennsylvania Death Statute limits the causes of action to
those occasioned by "unlawful violence or negligence ......
15 350 S.W2d 573, 577 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (dictum). The
suit in this case was brought seeking recovery for death which resulted from the deceased's
having been tranfused with the wrong type of blood.
16 E.g., DiBelardino v. Lemmon Pharmacal Co., 208 A.2d 283, 285 (Pa. 1965); Schnabl
v. Ford Motor Co., 195 N.W.2d 602, 608 (Wis. 1972); 25A C.J.S. Death § 23 n.53.5 (1966).
17 Goelz v. J.K. & Susie L. Wadley Research Inst. & Blood Bank, 350 S.W.2d 573, 577
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (dictum).
18 Id. at 577.
19 The defendant in this case, a research institute and blood bank, was a charitable
institution. Since charitable immunity was alive at the time this case was decided, had
the court granted recovery under breach of implied warranty, it would have, in effect,
recognized a means of circumventing charitable immunity.
Through dictum, the court said: "It is true that a breach of contract may also constitute
a tort, in which case a cause of action may ordinarily arise under our death statute on
the grounds of tort, not a breach of contract as such." Id. at 577.
20 Vassallo v. Nederl-Amerik Stoomv Maats Holland, 162 Tex. 52, 344 S.W.2d 421 (1961).
21 E.g., The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588, 598, 79 S. Ct. 503, 509, 3 L. Ed.2d 524,
531 (1959) (concurring opinion).
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equipment, appurtenances and crew met a certain standard." 22 Within
the context of this case, the Texas Supreme Court said the purpose of
the Death Act is to permit the plaintiff to assert any basis for recovery
23
which the deceased would have had if he were alive.
Since the purpose of the wrongful death acts was to remedy the harsh
common law principle which barred recovery for the death of an individual, 24 the weight of authority, as indicated by Justice Cardozo,
urges a liberal construction of the death acts.
Death statutes have their roots in dissatisfaction with the archaisms of the law.... It would be a misfortune if a narrow or grudging process of construction were to exemplify and perpetuate the
very evils to be remedied. 25
Through a liberal construction, courts of other jurisdictions have held
that a breach of an implied warranty is embraced by their wrongful
death acts. 20 According to the Supreme Court of Texas, the purpose
"was never meant to freeze the statute as of 1925, thereby rendering it
cover
necessary for the legislature to constantly adopt amendments to
' '27
decisions.
court
or
statute
by
recognized
are
they
as
new rights
Although there is no dispute that death acts apply to actions ex
delicto,28 meaning tortious in nature, some jurisdictions have balked at
29
construing the death acts so liberally as to include actions ex contractu.
In Texas, the question of whether or not an action ex contractu lies
under the Death Act was decided in the negative in Eubanks v.
22 Id. at 598, 70 S. Ct. at 509, 3 L. Ed.2d at 531. The Supreme Court allowed recovery
for unseaworthiness based upon the New Jersey Death Statute, which reads: "When the
N.J. STAT. ANN.
death of a person is caused by a wrongful act, neglect or default .
2A:31-1 (1952).
2
aVassallo v. Nederl-Amerik Stoomv Maats Holland, 162 Tex. 52, 57, 344 S.W.2d 421,
424 (1961).
24Baker v. Bolton, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (N.P. 1808).
25 Van Beeck v. Sabine Towing Co., 300 U.S. 342, 350, 57 S. Ct. 452, 456, 81 L. Ed.
685, 690 (1937) (Cardozo, J.).
26 E.g., Greco v. S.S. Kresge Co., 12 N.E.2d 557, 562 (N.Y. 1938). "The statute was enacted
to remedy partially that evil, not to perpetuate it by leaving the statute open to narrow
construction." Schnabl v. Ford Motor Co., 195 N.W.2d 602, 606 (Wis. 1972). "The statute
is a remedial one, and should be construed, not strictly, but so as to advance the remedy,
and suppress the supposed wrong and injustice existing under the former condition of
the law."
27 Vassallo v. Nederl-Amerik Stoomv Maats Holland, 162 Tex. 52, 59, 344 S.W.2d 421,
426 (1961). Contra, an opponent of liberal construction might attempt to limit the construction with the doctrine of Ejusdem Generis, which means: "[W]here words of a
particular description in a statute are followed by general words that are not so specific
and limited, unless there be a clear manifestation of a contrary purpose, the general
words are to be construed as applicable to persons or things or cases of like kind to those
designated by the particular words." Farmers' & Mechanics' Nat'l Bank v. Hanks, 104
Tex. 320, 327, 137 S.W. 1120, 1124 (1911).
28 E.g., Whiteley v. Webb's City, 55 So. 2d 730, 731 (Fla. 1951); Greco v. S.S. Kresge Co.,
122 N.E.2d 557, 561 (N.Y. 1938).
9E.g., Thaggard v. Vafes, 119 So. 647, 649 (Ala. 1929); Braun v. Riel, 40 S.W.2d 621,
623 (Mo. 1931). Contra, e.g., Foran v. Carangelo, 216 A.2d 638, 641 (Conn. 1966) (dictum);
Zostautas v. St. Anthony De Padua Hosp., 178 N.E.2d 303, 307 (Ill. 1961).
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Schwalbe.30 Although the court in Eubanks3' held that actions ex
contractu were not encompassed by the Death Act, the court did allow
recovery under the Death Act based upon the principle that a tortious
32
breach of duty arising from a contractualrelationship is recoverable.
However, in a later case, Vassallo v. Nederl-Amerik Stoomv Maats
Holland,38 the Supreme Court of Texas voiced its intention to allow
recovery under the Death Act with no restrictions as to the basis of
the claim asserted-except that it be one to which the deceased would
have been entitled if he had not died. 4 If this broad statement, which
was made in the context of allowing recovery for unseaworthiness, can
be taken to mean the Texas Supreme Court will allow recovery for
actions ex contractu, then all doubts will be resolved in favor of recovery for a breach of an implied warranty.
However, assume arguendo that the Death Act is to be narrowly
construed to encompass only actions ex delicto. Temporarily laying
aside the argument for liberal construction, is a breach of an implied
warranty, which causes the death of an individual, an action ex delicto?
"The seller's warranty is a curious hybrid, born of the illicit intercourse of tort and contract, unique in the law."835 Although many, if
not most, lawyers think of the word "warranty" as being contractual,
"in many cases, at least, to hold that a warranty 'is a contract is to
speak the language of pure fiction.' "86 As a matter of public policy,87
the law has imposed a warranty on manufacturers for the purpose of
protecting the public health. 88 This warranty is not40 contractual in
nature, 9 but "bespeaks a sui generis cause of action.
80 55 S.W.2d 906, 907 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1932) (semble), afl'd in part and rev'd
in part sub nom., United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Eubanks, 126 Tex. 405, 87 S.W.2d
248 (1935).
31Id.
82 Id. at 907 (semble). The court cited several cases which mentioned this statement,
but never expressly stated whether it was to be adopted. However, due to the court's disposition of the case, it is logical to assume the adoption.
98 162 Tex. 52, 344 S.W.2d 421 (1961).
84 Id. at 57, 344 S.W.2d at 424: "It is our opinion that under the express provisions of
the Wrongful Death Act, the plaintiff is permitted to assert any basis for recovery that
the decedent could have asserted if he were alive ...." This statement was made in the
context of allowing recovery for unseaworthiness, which resulted in death, notwithstanding
the fact that the deceased had been contributorily negligent.
In supporting this judgment, the court quoted from Holley v. The Manfred Stansfield,

269 F.2d 317, 321 (4th Cir. 1959):
[1 his statute was intended not only to take away from the wrongdoer the common
aw immunity resulting from the death of an injured party, but to grant recovery
in all instances where a decedent would have recovered. The statute appears not to
concern itself with which law, local or maritime, would have supported the recovery,
but only whether there would have been a recovery.
85 W. PROSsER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF ToRTs § 95, at 634 (4th ed. 1971).
36 Id. at 635.
87 Griggs Canning Co. v. Josey, 139 Tex. 623, 625, 164 S.W.2d 835, 836 (1942).
38 Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 616, 164 S.W.2d 828, 833 (1942).

891d. at 616, 164 S.W.2d at 833.
40 Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 207 A.2d 305, 311 (N.J. 1965).
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The gravamen of a cause of action for breach of an implied warranty that food is fit for human consumption is the personal injury
which results, and the action "sounds in tort." The cause of action
is not ex contractu.4 1
This dual role of the word "warranty" flourished during the growth
of strict liability as applied to defective lroducts. 42 The birth of strict
liability was through the conception that an implied warranty either
ran with the goods to the consumer or was made directly to the consumer.48 These theories arose through the need to get away from the
intricacies of sales law and the obstacles it posed to a recovery. 44 The
law of sales imposed several obstacles in the way of recovery-privity, 4"
reliance upon the skill or judgment of the seller, 46 and exclusion or
disclaimer of warranties. 47
The tortious aspect of warranty, "an implied warranty imposed by
law, ' 48 was codified in the Restatement (Second) of Torts49 under the

name of "strict liability" in tort:
One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or
consumer, or tohis property ....10
This rule applies even though:
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.5'
41 Gosling v. Nichols, 139 P.2d 86, 87 (Cal. 1943). This was a death case based upon a
breach of implied warranty that food was fit for consumption, wherein recovery was
allowed.
42 W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 95, at 635 (4th ed. 1971).
48 Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J.
1099, 1125 (1960). Dean Prosser discusses a number of other theories which had been
devised to allow recovery.
44 E.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 81 (N.J. 1960); Jacob E.
Decker & Sons v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 620, 164 S.W.2d 828, 833 (1942). "The policy of
the law to protect the health and life of the public would only be half served if it were

to make liability depend on the ordinary contractual warranty. Privity of contract and

reliance on the skill and judgment of the manufacturer or other vendor would be necessary
to a recovery in such a case."
45See Baxter v. Ford Motor.Co., 12 P.2d 409, 412 (Wash. 1932). However, Tx. Bus. &
COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.318 (1968) leaves the question of the privity requirement neutral
for the courts' determination.
46TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.315 (1968).
47 TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.316 (1968).
48 Griggs Canning Co. v. Josey, 139 Tex. 623, 634, 164 S.W.2d 835, 840 (1942).
49 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
50 Id. § 402A.
51 ld. § 402A.
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Although there was no mention of the word "warranty" in this rule
of "strict liability" in tort, the authors commented:
There is nothing in this Section which would prevent any court
from treating the rule stated as a matter of "warranty" to the user
or consumer. But if this is done, it should be recognized and
understood that the "warranty" is a very different kind of warranty
from those usually found in the sale of goods, and that it is not
subject to the various contract rules which have grown up to sur52
round such sales.
These two separate and distinct remedies, breach of an implied
contractual warranty and breach of an implied tortious warranty imposed by law, may coexist and recovery may be obtained under either
one.53 The Supreme Court of Texas, in Jacob E. Decker & Sons v.
"Capps,54 declared:
The fact, however, that the liability may be sustained in some
cases because of a breach of a contractual warranty does not argue
against the sustaining of liability on the ground herein adhered
55
to-warranty imposed by law as a matter of public policy.
The Decker decision recognized strict liability in tort for foodstuffs. 56
In a later decision, McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 57 the Texas Supreme Court adopted the strict tort liability proposed by the Restatement (Second) of Torts.58 In doing so, the court supported its opinion
with a quotation from the Decker case: 59
While a right of action in such a case is said to spring from a
"warranty," it should be noted that the warranty here referred to
is not the more modern contractual warranty, but is an obliga60
tion imposed by law to protect public health.
As previously discussed, there are two theories offered whereby recovery could and should be allowed under the Death Act for breach
of an implied warranty. One theory accentuates the remedial nature
of the act and proposes liberal construction to allow recovery for any
cause of action, whether ex contractu or ex delicto. Liberal construction is urged because the very reason for adopting the statute was to
Id. § 402A, comment m at 356.
53 Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 618, 164 S.W.2d 828, 832 (1942).
54 Id.
55 Id. at 618, 164 S.W.2d at 832.
56 Id. at 612, 164 S.W.2d at 829.
57 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. Sup. 1967).
58 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
59 Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W2d 828 (1942).
60 McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, 416 S.W.2d 787, 789 (Tex. Sup. 1967).
52
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alleviate the harshness of the common law doctrine that death gave
rise to no civil action. To disallow recovery because an action does not
sound in tort is to defeat the purpose of the Death Act. The other
theory supporting recovery is that an action for breach of an implied
warranty, which results in death, is not ex contractu, but is ex delicto.
This author finds it hard, if not impossible, to understand how such
an action could be ex contractu. The word "warranty" has caused the
mass of confusion in the decisions of other jurisdictions, due to the
failure to distinguish between an implied contractual warranty and an
implied warranty imposed by law, which sounds in tort. Texas courts
have paved the way for recovery by making the distinction between
the tort arm and the contract arm of an implied warranty.
Notwithstanding the often cited Goelz case6 ' as being indicative of
Texas law, it is probable that Texas courts will allow recovery under
the Death Act for breach of an implied warranty. Courts of other jurisdictions "are now swinging to the affirmative, as to whether the tort
character of a breach of warranty is sufficient to include such an action
'6 2
under the wrongful death acts."
Larry Glenn Hyden
61 350 S.W.2d 573 (rex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (dictum).
62 W. PROSsER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 127, at 903 (4th ed. 1971).
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